MOGADISHU, Somalia — Since the collapse of Somalia’s central government in 1991, the country has struggled with deep political disorder, violent fragmentation, and a prolonged failure to build functioning institutions. While Somalia remains internationally recognised, its sovereignty has weakened due to internal dysfunction and external opportunism.
Events in the past two years confirm how far that erosion has progressed. In January 2024, Ethiopia entered into a formal agreement with the administration of Somaliland. The deal reportedly granted Ethiopia commercial and military access to the port in exchange for potential diplomatic recognition of Somaliland, thereby recognising it as a separate political entity. In December 2025, Israel recognised Somaliland as an independent state. These actions were not isolated. They followed a broader trend of regional actors engaging with Somalia through its breakaway regions or political elites, bypassing the federal government entirely.
The reasons are straightforward. The Somali state today struggles to articulate its position or assert control over its territory. At the root of this fragility lies a political system shaped by exclusion and inequality. The 4.5 clan power-sharing formula, introduced initially to stabilise post-war governance, has hardened into a rigid structure that allocates positions not on merit but based on tribal identity. This has turned ministries into clan quotas. National interests are often secondary.
Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, this political model has only deepened. Senior appointments have regularly gone to close allies, friends, and relatives. Public office is used as a reward for loyalty. The president himself has dismissed criticism of nepotism, at one point asking, “What is the problem if I recruit my own child?” This attitude reflects how deeply personalised rule has taken root in a system intended to be national and institutional.
Government ministries lack independent authority. The foreign service has lost experienced diplomats. Political appointees manage embassies. The public administration operates through informal networks. Policy decisions come from the top, and often bypass technical expertise. In many areas, there is no functioning state presence.
Corruption is no longer hidden or denied. It is accepted as the cost of doing politics. Entering government is widely seen as an opportunity for personal gain. State contracts are awarded behind closed doors. Development funds disappear. Officials take office expecting to profit, not to serve. There are no effective investigations. There is no enforcement. The system protects itself from scrutiny.
This internal collapse has created opportunities for foreign governments to act freely. Some make deals with regional authorities. Others offer political recognition to breakaway territories. Several Gulf and Arab states have engaged Somalia through back channels, working with influential individuals rather than through the state. The assumption is apparent: Somalia’s institutions are too weak to manage its own affairs and too divided to respond.
Meanwhile, the international community continues to issue routine statements in support of Somali unity. Yet there is little willingness to confront the internal conditions that sustain this erosion. The 4.5 system remains in place. Corruption is tolerated. Security support is prioritised over political reform. Donors avoid direct engagement with the question of state legitimacy, even as their money funds a system that cannot stand on its own.
Somalia today stands at a dangerous crossroad. Its legal sovereignty is being tested by foreign actors who no longer respect its borders. But the greater danger lies within. A state that cannot represent all its citizens, hold its leaders accountable, or guarantee fundamental fairness will remain vulnerable. No amount of legal recognition will protect a state that is collapsing from the inside.
If there is to be a future for Somalia as a functioning, sovereign nation, it must begin with real reform. End the distribution of public office based on clan. End the culture of corruption and political loyalty. Build institutions that serve the people, not the president or his circle. Give professional public servants a place in government. Demand accountability.
Sovereignty is not just about borders. It is about legitimacy. It is about trust. It concerns the government’s ability to represent all its people, not just the few who surround it. Until Somalia does that, no amount of external recognition will matter. And no one should be surprised when others act as if the Somali state no longer exists.
By Abdullahi Mohodin Hassan (Abdullahi Yabarow
Author opinions are their own and may not reflect Hortabin Media.
